Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei
Perspectives in Continental Philosophy
Fordham University Press, New York, 2004
pp. 52-53
In the writings of the 1930s and early 1940s, "decision" is neither autonomous, nor is it described as spontaneity, as in Sartre's Transcendance of the Ego, but rather as a form of submission to what the poet "instigates". When Heidegger then writes of freedom, it is to be understood not as the autonomy of a subject freed by virtue of its transcendental grounds from the causality of nature, but as the transcendance — as Dasein or as language itself — which marks Being's disclosure.
p. 64
Poetic language reveals something of the world without failing to indicate that it is a partial revelation. This is the relation of poetic language to a phenomenological account of truth as aletheia [...]
[Poetic language] makes evident that language itself is a revealing — in contrast to conceptual language, which aims at transparency and total exposure of the "real".
p. 69
[Both] techne and poiesis are modes of revealing.
p. 88
Language, thought poetically, is "the relation of all relations" and thus of the relation between time and Being, time and space, space and Being.
p. 92
[Ereignis: event of appropriation]
Heidegger's thinking succeeds in the "reversal" of Being and Time itself [...]: to think Being, which is "beyond beings".
p. 97
The origin of Saying, "which has never been spoken" is "given voice" in poetic language.
p. 99
A question that remains to be answered is whether this unique capacity of poetic language eschews all vestiges of subjectivity, as Heidegger claims in his account of the poet's role in the remembrance of Being, or whether there is not, as I argue in this chapter, an essential structure of subjectivity and selfhood at the heart of the poetic utterance.
p. 102
T.S. Eliot's "Four Quartets": "I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say where".
p. 134
Hölderlin's poetry is grounded in "poetical reflection" [...] In poetic reflection, the poet experiences "the world" and "life" from an aesthetic rather than rationalistic perspective.
p 139
In Blanchot's terms this founding is wholly overridden by an irreversible "exile" from unity or wholeness, an exile that, contrary to Heidegger's reading, knows no return home — to a destiny, a people, or an historical truth.
p. 144
One of the principal aims of Heidegger's poetics is to counter the technological attitude towards an objectified nature or earth by offering the poetic as an alternative configuration of human dwelling.
p. 147
The interpretations of Hölderlin withstand over three decades of transitions in Heidegger's thinking, from the eschatological-political aesthetics of the 1930s to the thinking of the Gelassenheit as a quiet sheltering of possibility in the 1950s and 1960s.
p. 149
The subject is for Heidegger the essence of technological, anthropocentric thinking.
p. 152
Aesthetic judgments, Kant writes, "must involve a claim to a subjective universality" [Critique of Judgement, 212].
p. 162
Although Kant intends aesthetic judgment to unify the transcendental system as a "bridge" between pure and practical reason, Hölderlin ultimately rejects the possibility of this unification.
p.190
In a letter to his brother Hölderlin [...] writes:My love is the human race [...]