What is this thing called Science?

Alan F. Chalmers
Third Edition, 1999 (2003 reprint)
Open University Press, Maidenhead

A clear review of modern debates in epistemology.
Only a superficial touch of ontology, from a scientific point of view.
Surprisingly unconclusive, given its pragmatism.

Chapter 1 - Science as knowledge derived from the facts of experience

A widely held commonsense view of science

p 2

Rather, so the familiar story goes, knowledge was based largely on authority, especially the authority of the philosopher Aristotle and the authority of the Bible. It was only when this authority was challenged by an appeal to experience, by pioneers of the new science such as Galileo, that modern science became possible. The account of the oft-told story of Galileo and the Leaning Tower of Pisa nicely captures the idea.

The fallibility of observation statements

p 17

The observation statement "the apparent size of Venus does not change size during the course of the year" was straightforwardly confirmed, and was referred to in the Preface to Copernicus's On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres as a fact confirmed "by all the experience of the ages". Osiander was the author of the Preface. It took Galileo to show how the predicted change in size can be clearly discerned if Venus and Mars are viewed through a telescope.

Chapter 3 - Experiment

pp 27-40
"Facts" are not established by "observation" but by careful experimentation. They have to be relevant, and protected from interferences.

Chapter 8 - Theories as structures I: Kuhn's paradigms

Kuhn's ambivalence on progress through revolutions

pp 122-123

Kuhn was charged with having put forward a "relativist" view of scientific progress. Kuhn was not comfortable with that charge.

Objective knowledge

p 125

If the lawyer has not discovered the inconsistency, it may have remained undiscovered.

Chapter 15 - Realism and anti-realism

Anti-realism

p 232

Poincar� compared theories to a library catalog. Catalogs can be appraised for their usefulness, but it would be wrong-headed to think of them as true or false.

Some standard objections and the anti-realist response

p 237

A prominent anti-realist, Pierre Duhem, in his book To Save the Phenomena, chose the example of the Copernician revolution to support his case.

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