...the central philosophical problem presented by the human sciences was considered to be epistemological --by analogy to the natural sciences and their foundation in Kantian philosophy. [...] Dilthey pursued the task of a critique of historical reason. [...] In carrying this task, however, Dilthey was led beyond his original epistemological starting point, and so it was he who introduced hermeneutics into philosophy.
p 517
That the interpretation of law is, in a juridical sense, an act that creates law cannot be contested.
p 518
Legal positivism, which would like to limit legal reality entirely to the established law and its correct application, probably has no supporters today.
p 548
All of us have had the experience of listening to a bad actor and getting the impression that he was already thinking of the next word. That is not speaking. Speaking is only speaking if we accept the risk of positing something and following out its implications.
p 554
It is in the nature of the case, then, that the dialogue between philosophy and philosophy of the sciences never really succeeds. The Adorno-Popper debate, like that between Habermas and Albert, shows this all to clearly. By raising "critical rationality" to the status of an absolute measure of truth, empirical theory of science regards hermeneutic reflection as theological obscurantism.